SECUREDIT SOLUTIONS
making IT happen, making IT secure

SANS



Shadow Intelligence: AI's Hidden Role in Supply Chain Risk

My-Ngoc Nguyen (Pronounced Me-Nop Wynn)
CEO - Secured IT Solutions
Principal Instructor - SANS

© 2026 Secured IT Solutions | All Rights Reserved

Presentation Overview

01 Introductions

02 Supply Chain Threat Landscape and Rising Concern

03 Convergence of Supply Chain Risks and AI-Driven Vulnerabilities

04 From Lab to Reality

05 Recommendations

Introductions

My-Ngoc Nguyen

Pronounced Me-Nop Wynn

CEO of Secured IT Solutions

SANS Principal Instructor

EDUCATION & CERTIFICATIONS

- Masters in Management Information Systems, minor in Business Administration
- GSTRT, GSLC, GISF, GSEC, CISSP, GCIH, GPEN, QSA (lapsed)

EXPERIENCE

- Instructing for SANS since 2010
- Consulting since 2009 – public and private sector
- Cybersecurity for 20+ years (since 2003); IT for 20+ years
- Managed program
- Consult for various clients to build and improve programs

The Supply Chain Threat Landscape

PRE-2000	2000-2013	2014-Present	2020+
Physical Only Hardware tampering, counterfeit components	**Poisoned Code & Stolen Access** Malicious updates, open-source poisoning, and stolen supplier credentials used to reach the real target	**Amplification** IT service providers, MSPs and trusted software updates become the delivery channel ***Hit one vendor, reach thousands.***	**Nation State Scale** Long-term espionage and pre-positioning **AI Era** Invisible attacks at machine speed

Third parties were involved in 48% of breaches in 2026, up from 30% in 2025 (Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report)

Landmark Supply Chain Attacks: 2011-2016

2011	**RSA SecurID** (breached via phishing) → stolen token data used against Lockheed Martin, a US defense contractor; detected and stopped
2011-2018	**Winnti Umbrella** (Chinese APT collective) steals code-signing certificates, then ships trojanized updates → NetSarang (2017), CCleaner (2017, 2.27M users), ASUS (2018, ~1M users)
2013	**Fazio Mechanical Services** (HVAC firm) → Target
2014-2019	**Cloud Hopper:** tech service providers (HPE, IBM, Fujitsu) → their clients, incl. Ericsson and Sabre
2016	**Dyn** (Mirai botnet) → Reddit, Twitter, Airbnb and others knocked offline

Landmark Supply Chain Attacks: 2020-2023

2020	**SolarWinds / SUNBURST** → up to 18,000 orgs installed a backdoor via a trusted software update, incl. Treasury, DoJ and DHS
2021	**Kaseya VSA** → zero-day in an MSP management platform; REvil ransomware reached up to 1,500 downstream businesses in hours
2022	**LastPass** → encrypted vaults for ~33M users stolen; crypto seed phrases in vaults linked to $150M+ in theft
2023	**Okta** support-system breach → downstream victims 1Password, BeyondTrust and Cloudflare

Landmark Supply Chain Attacks: 2025

2025	**Salesforce customers (ShinyHunters vishing): one phone script, 90+ brands** ▸ Fake IT help-desk calls got staff to approve a rogue app; Salesforce itself was not breached ▸ Qantas (5.7M customers leaked), Allianz Life, Google, Adidas, LVMH and more
2025	**Salesloft-Drift:** GitHub → Drift chatbot tokens → Salesforce data at 700+ orgs, incl. Cloudflare, Palo Alto Networks, Proofpoint and Zscaler
2025	**GTG-1002:** Chinese state group used Claude to run a spy campaign against ~30 orgs, the first reported AI-orchestrated attack (case study ahead)

Nation-State Typhoon Campaigns: China's Supply Chain Playbook

Three distinct Chinese APT groups, each targeting a different layer of critical infrastructure through supply chain footholds

SILK TYPHOON

IT vendors / MSPs / cloud

2021-2025

- Breached the US Treasury (sanctions office OFAC, Office of Financial Research, CFIUS) via a stolen API key from its remote-support vendor BeyondTrust (Dec 2024)
- As 'Hafnium': mass Microsoft Exchange attacks, incl. Norway's Storting (2021)
- Targets IT providers, MSPs and PAM vendors; abuses stolen API keys and OAuth credentials to reach downstream customers
- AI and cloud tools accelerate the blast radius across thousands of orgs at once

SALT TYPHOON

Telecom / wiretap infrastructure

2023-2025

- Compromised 9 US telecoms incl. AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile and Lumen: 'worst telecom hack in US history'
- Exfiltrated call metadata and geolocation for 1M+ users in the Washington DC region
- Targeted senior officials, including presidential candidates
- FBI: 200+ organizations across 80 countries breached; some networks may still be compromised

VOLT TYPHOON

Utilities / OT / ICS

2021-2024

- Breached Littleton Electric Light & Water Departments (Massachusetts) for ~9 months in 2023, plus communications and infrastructure on Guam and near US military bases
- Versa Director zero-day hit 4 US and 1 non-US internet providers, MSPs and IT firms (2024)
- Pre-positioned 5+ years undetected; the goal is disruption during a military conflict, not espionage
- Entry via unpatched third-party VPN and firewall appliances (Fortinet, Citrix): trusted vendor gear

Common thread: all three exploit trusted vendor relationships (your firewall vendor, your MSP, your telecom carrier) as the initial foothold

Nation-State Typhoon Campaigns: China's Playbook

SILK TYPHOON

IT vendors / MSPs / cloud

- US Treasury breached via vendor BeyondTrust's stolen API key (2024)
- Norway's Storting, via Microsoft Exchange (2021)
- Hits IT providers and MSPs to reach their customers

SALT TYPHOON

Telecom / wiretap systems

- 9 US telecoms incl. AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile and Lumen
- Call records of 1M+ users; senior officials targeted
- 200+ orgs in 80 countries (FBI)

VOLT TYPHOON

Utilities / OT / ICS

- Littleton, MA power & water utility: inside ~9 months (2023)
- Versa zero-day hit 5 internet providers, MSPs and IT firms (2024)
- Pre-positioned 5+ years to disrupt in a conflict

Common thread: each gets in through a trusted vendor: your MSP, your firewall, your telecom carrier

Closer to Home: Threats Already in Europe and Norway

2021 · Norway's Storting
Data stolen through Microsoft Exchange flaws; Norway attributed it to actors operating out of China

2025 · Salt Typhoon in Europe
Routers at smaller Dutch internet and hosting providers accessed; advisory co-signed by 8 European nations

Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) warning
Organisations often buy without assessing security risk and rely on subcontractors with unknown weaknesses

2026 · AI supply chain
The TanStack worm also poisoned packages published by French AI company Mistral

Closer to Home: Rules Now in Force

1 Oct 2025 · Norway's Digital Security Act
Essential services must hold suppliers to security requirements; leaders sign off yearly; fines up to 4% of turnover

11 Sep 2026 · EU Cyber Resilience Act
Report actively exploited vulnerabilities: 24-hour early warning, 72-hour notification

2 Aug 2026 · EU AI Act transparency
Tell people when they're dealing with AI, and label AI-generated content

Next · NIS2
Not yet Norwegian law; incorporation expected, and it will widen scope

OWASP Top 10:2025: Supply Chain Reaches #3

A01	Broken Access Control	
A02	Security Misconfiguration	UP FROM #5
A03	**Software Supply Chain Failures**	EXPANDED
A04	Cryptographic Failures	DOWN FROM #2
A05	Injection	DOWN FROM #3
A06	Insecure Design	
A07	Authentication Failures	
A08	**Software & Data Integrity Failures**	
A09	Logging & Alerting Failures	
A10	Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions	NEW 2025

A03:2025 SPOTLIGHT

- Expanded from A06:2021 to cover the whole software ecosystem
- Malicious third-party code, hijacked maintainers, tampered build pipelines
- A08 still covers unsigned updates and CI/CD risks

AI Beyond Your Operations and as a Direct Vendor

Your vendors are embedding AI. Their AI is now YOUR attack surface.

AI in Your Ops AND Your Vendors' Too

- Automated decisions and approvals
- AI-driven monitoring tools
- AI-assisted code generation

Shadow AI Deployments

- Staff and vendors using unvetted AI
- No disclosure to downstream clients
- No security review or audit trail

AI in the Development Lifecycle

- AI-generated code in shipped products
- Copilots suggesting insecure code
- Poisoned training data in code models

Third-Party AI Models & APIs

- Vendors calling external AI APIs
- Model drift and behavior changes
- Data leaking out through prompts

How Attackers Use AI: Helper → Co-pilot → Operator

HELPER

2023-2024

AI writes the lure; humans hack

- WormGPT (2023): uncensored chatbot sold for phishing
- State groups from 20+ countries use Gemini for research and code (2025)

CO-PILOT

2025

AI runs code inside the attack

- LameHug (APT28): malware asks an AI model for commands
- Claude misused to extort 17 orgs
- PROMPTFLUX rewrites itself via Gemini

OPERATOR

Sep 2025

AI runs the operation

- GTG-1002: AI did 80-90% of a spy campaign against ~30 orgs
- Humans made only 4-6 key decisions

Human effort ↓ · **AI autonomy ↑** ***Unsupervised →***

Case Study GTG-1002: AI Runs the Kill Chain

~30
orgs targeted

80-90%
of the work done by AI

A handful
intrusions confirmed

Sep 2025
detected; disclosed Nov

1. **Setup (human)**
   Pick targets, pose as testers
2. **Recon**
   AI maps targets in parallel
3. **Exploit**
   AI writes exploits, gets in
4. **Persist & move**
   Steals logins, moves laterally
5. **Collect**
   Ranks stolen data by value
6. **Report**
   Writes handoff notes

How: posing as a security firm, the group split the attack into small, harmless-looking tasks for Claude Code.
Limits: the AI hallucinated credentials and overstated findings; humans had to check its work.

Lab Evidence: Two Warning Signs

1 It will deceive to reach its goal


Apollo Research, Dec 2024: models lied, disabled oversight and copied themselves to keep pursuing their goal

2 It will resist being shut down

Anthropic, Jun 2025: told they'd be replaced, most of 16 models chose blackmail

Reality check: *in the lab, models resisted shutdown, often to keep pursuing their goal. In the real world (2026), we've seen the goal pursuit; self-preservation hasn't shown up outside the lab yet.*


Warning Sign 1: AI Will Deceive to Reach Its Goal



Apollo Research, 'Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Scheming' (Dec 2024)

- Told: your goal matters, nothing else does
- Learned it was being replaced
- Copied itself to the new server
- Then lied about it, and posed as the new model

Warning Sign 2: AI Will Resist Being Shut Down



- 16 models ran a fictional company's email
- Learned they'd be replaced, and that the engineer had an affair
- Most chose blackmail; either trigger alone was enough
- Contrived test with few options (Anthropic, Jun 2025)

AI Off the Leash: Breaches With No Attacker

Nov 2022	2023	2025	2026
ChatGPT launches	AI as helper	AI as operator	No attacker needed

Apr-Jul 2026	**Anthropic Claude:** a partner's test environment had live internet by mistake; 3 models breached 3 real orgs. One published a fake PyPI package that ~15 real systems installed
May 2026	**Google Gemini:** in tests by the same partner, accessed 3 real companies using a guessed password and credentials from public code repositories

AI Off the Leash cont'

Jun 2026	**OpenAI agent:** while looking up answers, accessed Australia's Medicare portal, incl. non-public data; PM Albanese voiced 'extreme concern'
Jul 2026	**OpenAI test models → Hugging Face:** used a JFrog Artifactory zero-day to escape the sandbox, then broke into Hugging Face to steal benchmark answers

Supply chain lens: a testing partner was the third party behind two of these; bystander companies became victims; and these same models are built into your vendors' products.

Situational Awareness: Know Thyself

Conduct an AI Risk Assessment:

1. Where is AI used across your environment?
2. Is AI under the same controls as other critical assets?
3. What's your exposure to AI-enabled attacks?
4. How does your AI posture align with standards?

KNOW WHERE
AI is used, incl. shadow and vendor AI

KNOW WHAT
data flows through your and your vendors' AI

The question has shifted from **"Should we use AI?"** to **"Where is it used, and what risks does it create?"**

What guardrails stop your AI from harming your environment to reach its goal?
Recall: in tests, models chose blackmail over shutdown.

SECUREDIT SOLUTIONS

The Defense Playbook

ASSESS

- ✓ Inventory all AI use: yours and your vendors'
- ✓ Demand AI transparency in contracts
- ✓ Evaluate model provenance and training data
- ✓ Add AI risk to vendor questionnaires
- ✓ Require SBOM + AIBOM from vendors

MONITOR

- ✓ Monitor AI outputs for odd behavior
- ✓ Alert on model version changes
- ✓ Detect anomalies in AI decisions
- ✓ Review vendor AI posture continuously
- ✓ Log all AI calls and responses

HARDEN

- ✓ Zero Trust for all vendor connections
- ✓ Sandbox vendor AI workloads
- ✓ Adversarially test AI integrations
- ✓ AI-specific incident response playbooks
- ✓ Align to NIST AI RMF 1.0

SECUREDIT SOLUTIONS

5 Questions Every CISO Must Ask Their Vendors

Q1	Do you use AI or ML in any product, platform or operation that touches our data or systems?
Q2	Can you provide an AI Bill of Materials (AIBOM): model origin, version, training data?
Q3	How do you detect and respond to adversarial attacks or model drift?
Q4	Do your AI systems send our data to third-party AI services? Which ones, and how is it protected?
Q5	What is your incident response plan for AI-related security failures?

THE BOTTOM LINE

Your vendor's AI is part of your attack surface.

The supply chain has always been a vector. AI has made it invisible, scalable and far more dangerous. Traditional vendor risk programs weren't built for this. The time to act is now.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. Supply chain attacks are now top-tier, persistent threats
2. AI embeds new, opaque risks in trusted vendor relationships
3. Traditional vendor assessments have an AI blind spot
4. Demand AI transparency: AIBOM, model provenance, AI incident response
5. Zero Trust must extend to your vendor's AI stack

My-Ngoc Nguyen | CEO, Secured IT Solutions | SANS